Beyond Rhetoric to Due process Protective Rights for Children: A Civil Rights Approach is Imperative.

by Lewis Pitts, Esq.

[Note:  This article was originally published by the American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law as part of the publication Perspectives on Child Advocacy Law in the Early 21st Century (June 2000). The development of the article was made possible by a grant to the American Bar Association from the Foundation for Child Development.]


CONTENTS:

Introduction
Historic Pronouncements Regarding Personhood
The Pronounced Rights of Children
Case examples
   
> Gregory K - I Hear You Knocking But You Can't Come In
    > The Grissom Children - Sanctioning the Messenger
    > Samantha Frazier - Linking Litigation with Grassroots
Advocacy and Media
    > Chris B. - GAL as Potted Plant
The Unmet Legal Needs of Children
Essential but narrowly defined rights for children
Anchoring principles regarding custody
Three fears and misconceptions about children's rights of
    access to court and to be heard
   
1. Confusing the Right to be Heard and Access to Court
        with the Unilateral Right of the Child to Decide the Issue.
    2. Confusing the Narrowly Defined Right of Access to Court,
        Status as a Party, and the Right to Representation with
        the Notion that Children Have the Right to Open-Ended
        Litigation over matters Rightfully Considered Within
        Parental Judgment.
    3. Confusing the Common Law Concept that Children
        are Incompetent and Lack Capacity with the very
        different issue of their Right to Due Process Essential to
        Insuring Fairness in any Court Fact-Finding Process and
        to Protect their Life and Liberty.
Distinctions between traditional counsel and GAL representation
Impact of Chris B. of denial of counsel
Evolving first stage rights for children
A constitutional amendment for children
Ratification of the united nations convention on the
    rights of the child
Conclusion:  a Crusade for Children

References & Notes


BEYOND RHETORIC TO DUE PROCESS PROTECTIVE RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN: A CIVIL RIGHTS APPROACH IS IMPERATIVE
By Lewis Pitts

Introduction

The intent of this essay is to provoke deeper dialogue and action to redress the unmet legal needs of our nation’s children as a means of providing all children their basic right to a healthy, safe, happy life. The cornerstone argument is at once radical yet has been repeated for decades in our case law and rhetoric: children are persons not property and thereby entitled to the human dignity of due process of law. The essay's premise is that we must understand and tackle the inhuman way our system treats children, using a "civil rights" analysis, akin to the civil rights struggles waged by African Americans and women. Doing so draws upon the rich history of creative lawyering done in tandem with superstructure and grassroots mass action. But it also raises the crucial importance of linking such litigation simultaneously with public education, organizing, media work and other protected First Amendment activity.(1)

More importantly, the civil rights movement approach allows and encourages us to fight to end the mistreatment and abuse of our children with the moral outrage and indignation it deserves. The moral or fundamental justice (or theological, if you will) implications of our nation’s policy toward children has previously been urged. The 1990 Report of the US Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect concluded the issue amounted to a "national emergency." The report states:

The Board bases this conclusion on three findings: 1) each year hundreds of thousands of children are being starved and abandoned, burned and severely beaten, raped and sodomize, berated and belittled; 2) the system the nation has devised to respond to child abuse and neglect is failing; and 3) the United States spend billions of dollars on programs that deal with the results of the nation’s failure to treat child abuse and neglect...All Americans should be outraged by child maltreatment. (Emphasis added.)(2)

Further, the 1991 Final Report from the National Commission on Children, chaired by Senator Jay Rockefeller boldly stated:

As a commission on children, we could not avoid questioning the moral character of a nation that allows so many children to grow up poor, to live in unsafe dwellings and violent neighborhoods, to lack access to basic health care and a decent education. In our visits to communities across the country, we saw the consistent presence of institutional immorality--often unintended, but present nonetheless. We were shocked by the callous treatment of children in the child welfare system and the public health system.(Emphasis added.)(3)

Nearly a decade has passed since both these reports were issued and the continued "institutional immorality" remains as a huge sinful gap between our rhetoric proclaiming children as a national treasure and the reality of how we prioritize resources and attend to their actual needs.

This essay is not designed to be a law review type analysis or critique of specific legal issues, class action remedies, or other approaches. It is a broader attempt at thinking out of the box in light of the present crisis-condition of children despite years of reports, commissions, litigation, and the good faith efforts of many people. It assumes the reader already grasps the depth of the problems and ramifications to larger society of our maltreatment of children and does not attempt to "prove" those points.(4) To effectively address the denial of basic rights to children we will have to deal with complex and controversial things like economics, public policy, and politics. Therefore, the civil rights movement approach to meeting children's needs will meet resistance just as did Dr. Martin Luther King when he introduced economics and opposition to militarism into the struggle against segregation. Yet the inadequacies of the current effort speak for themselves. Business as unusual is leaving millions of children to suffer and belies our rhetoric that children are our national treasure.

The term "children's rights" seems open-ended and conjures up confusion and fears. This essay will attempt to define a first-step notion of children's rights that should be palatable to the vast majority of people. These rights are labeled here as protective due process rights and several case examples will be set forth. In addition to arguing that traditional representation based upon the expressed interest of the child is essential, this essay identifies the struggles for passage of a constitutional amendment for children and ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as crucial aspects of the civil rights movement for children. Finally, it is urged that litigation, public education, and a myriad of First Amendment activities be deployed in tandem by the Bar, the Judiciary, the medical profession, law schools, faith based organizations, social workers, teachers, child advocates/organizations, and regular citizens. We should respond to a national emergency with patriotic fervor befitting the tragedy caused by our "institutional immorality."

Historical Pronouncements Regarding Personhood

The Founders of the United States proclaimed it as "self-evident" that "all men are created equal", yet considered it obvious that, inter alia, African-American men were different. In fact, so different, that a black man had no rights which a white man was bound to respect. The US Supreme Court stated this principle in the 1854 Dred Scott(5) case. After a bloody civil war which ended in 1865, three amendments to the Constitution were passed purporting to end slavery and insure full equality for all "persons". The 13th Amendment outlawed slavery; the 14th Amendment promised equal protection and due process to all "persons"; the 15th Amendment promised African-Americans the right to vote. The notions of white supremacy were so ingrained that even these nationally ratified and unequivocal amendments were unable to insure treatment of African-Americans as full persons. In 1898 the Supreme Court upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson(6) the doctrine of "separate but equal" setting the stage for decades of segregation of all public and private services. Likewise, the right to vote was denied through poll taxes, literacy tests, intimidation, and violence. Finally, in 1954 the decision in Brown v. Board of Education(7) ordered an end to school segregation. Yet to this very day school segregation, voting rights, and other racial justice issues remain controversial and unresolved. The pronounced theory of equal protection and status as rights bearing persons has not in practice been fully accorded to African-Americans.

A similar pattern can be traced for women. In 1872, just a few years after ratification of the 14th Amendment promising all citizens equal protection of the law, the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois prohibition against women becoming lawyers.(8) Women were finally guaranteed the fundamental democratic right to vote by the 19th Amendment to the Constitution in 1920. Yet decades went by before women were allowed to serve on juries. Despite federal and state laws forbidding sexual discrimination, the practice of sexual discrimination continues today.

The early calls for equality for African Americans and women were countered by the assertion that full rights-bearing status was not necessary because someone else was looking out for "them". The slave master was said to have the best interest of his slave at heart; the master could and would look after the slave and therefore rights for the slave were unnecessary. Similarly, the husband or father was said to be caring for the woman and she, therefore, did not need to have legal rights.

African-Americans and women have in common the history of being treated essentially as property and as exceptions to the social contract and vision upon which our nation was established. For each, the articulation of the principle that members of each group were constitutional "persons" came well before society in general and the legal system, in particular, actually treated them as such. The situation for children has been very similar.(9) It has been over twenty-five years since the Supreme Court held that children have constitutional rights. It is past time to insure that these theoretical rights be put into practice.

The Pronounced Rights of Children

On paper, in court and statutory language, children seem to have constitutional rights. The 1967 Supreme Court decision of In re Gault stated "neither the 14th Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone" and that "under our constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."(10) Two years later the court had occasion to say: "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the constitution and possess constitutional rights."(11)

However, there has been a long history of treating children as objects of court proceedings, not as participants with rights and/or interests to be weighed and respected along side competing adult rights. How we "think" about children, our ideology regarding children, is still a fundamental cause of their maltreatment. The notion that children should be seen and not heard lives on.

Case Examples
Children are routinely treated as property in the legal system. A first step to overcoming such as antiquated notion is listening to children's voices and experiences. The core aspect of protective due process rights for children is their right/need to be heard. In order to be heard, a person needs the corollary rights of access to court and a lawyer. Children are routinely denied these fundamental rights. Below are four examples.

  • Gregory K - I Hear You Knocking But You Can’t Come In:
    In 1992 Gregory K. was ten years old and had been left "double-parked" in the Florida foster care system well beyond the statutory time limit. He had a family ready to adopt him but the child protective system (CPS), in whose custody he was, refused to initiate termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings. So Gregory found a lawyer who knocked on the courthouse door in his behalf petitioning for TPR and to be adopted. All the while Gregory languished as a ward of the state in foster care his appointed guardian ad litem never met him or spoke to him about his needs or desires. Predictably, the lawyer for the CPS moved to dismiss Gregory's petition claiming he lacked standing and capacity to bring any legal action. Gregory, who could be called the Rosa Parks of the Children's Rights movement, aroused national attention by his claim that he had a right to be heard on such matters as his own safety, liberty from state custody, and his desire for a permanent loving family. As director of the Legal Action Project of the National Committee for the Rights of the Child (LAP), this writer filed and argued an amicus brief before the trial judge opposing the motion to dismiss. Others expressed support for Gregory's position and a nascent movement for children's right to be heard strengthened.

    The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss and accepted the petition for TPR to be brought on for a hearing. The trial was nationally televised on the then fledgling Court TV network and the judge, based upon strong evidence, ordered parental rights terminated. Because it was a presidential election year with Bill Clinton as a candidate, Hillary Clinton's old law review articles about children's rights became a lightening rod for partisan politics. Ms. Clinton’s articles argued that children should have the due process rights to be heard in court through their own attorneys. The "spin" was astounding. The decision in favor of a child seeking to get out of government custody and into a private family was described by some critics as the Clinton’s notion of "big government" and their support for a child being allowed to "divorce" his parents. Some child advocates working at the national level spoke critically of the trial judge’s decision. The adoption was approved and Gregory became part of a wonderful family. However, the CPS appealed the decision. The Florida court of appeals reversed, holding that Gregory did not have the capacity to have brought the action.(12) Because of the embarrassment to CPS when Gregory's petition revealed the unlawful amount of time he had spent in foster care, CPS had filed their own petition for TPR with the trial court. Thus the court of appeals was able to let stand the adoption as based upon the valid CPS petition and hold that Gregory, because he was a minor, could have his knock at the courthouse door ignored even though he was bringing an admittedly meritorious claim.(13)
  • The Grisson Children - Sanctioning the Messenger:
    In 1992 the three Grissom teenagers were living with their mother in Missouri. Their father sought to have their mother held in contempt because the children refused to visit him as called for in an existing divorce and custody order. They testified that they did not want to visit with their father because he abused them. The trial judge, without notice to either parent and without any legal representation for the children, placed the children under the "custody and control of the Division of Family Services." He left physical custody with the mother but used the threat of state physical custody as leverage to coerce the mother to force the children to visit their father. When the children renewed their contentions of abuse and refused to visit, a hearing was scheduled where there was the real possibility the children would be taken away from their mother and ordered into a foster home or institutional placement. This writer, again as part of LAP, along with local counsel, moved in behalf of the children to intervene because of their fundamental liberty and safety interests at stake. Not only was the motion denied, the trial judge sanctioned both counsel for filing a frivolous motion. An appeal was filed and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to intervene but reversed the sanctions.(14) Anguishing negotiations kept the children from being placed in state custody or having to endure visits with their father. But the decision remains, denying children their right to be heard when they have fundamental interests at stake.
  • Samantha Frazier - Linking Litigation with Grassroots Advocacy and Media
    Samantha was nine years old when the CPS in Delaware petitioned for TPR. Her mother, a long time substance abuser, had abandoned her 4 years earlier by running off to another state with her substance abusing boyfriend. Samantha had bounced around several foster homes and been abused in one. Eventually she started living with a stable family that wanted to adopt her. At the TPR hearing, Samantha's biological mother had a free lawyer and Samantha had a CASA lay advocate, who had a lawyer.

    Samantha wanted to be adopted, but her testimony and desires were never heard by the court. The CASA urged, against Samantha's wishes, that Samantha be sent to South Carolina to live with her mother who was still in drug rehabilitation. Her mother did not even testify at the hearing. However, her drug counselor testified by phone that the mother would be a competent parent. The CPS attorney did not vigorously present the case for TPR and the judge ordered Samantha to live with her mom in South Carolina. The CPS attorney allowed the time for appeal to expire.

    A handful of Delaware advocates for children's rights, then known as Hear My Voice and now known as Grassroots Citizens for Children (GCC), began to make a fuss. They contacted the CPS officials and their attorney, the Attorney General, and local attorneys. All bemoaned how unfair it was that Samantha never got to be heard and her own supposed advocate argued against her. But they all said Samantha had no right to appeal and the time to appeal had passed anyway. She was treated as an object of the proceeding and not a participant. This writer, who is a volunteer with GCC, was urged to "do something."

    Believing that where there is a wrong there is a remedy, this writer drafted a simple four page pro se complaint for a writ of certiorari to be filed with the Delaware Supreme Court. In the plainest of language, the complaint pointed out the denial of Samantha's constitutional right to safety and her liberty interest in maintaining her relationship with her new family with whom she had been living. It also asserted that she was the real party in interest and had a fundamental due process right to access the court and be heard. The complaint was shipped over-night to Delaware to the GCC folks who had connections with Samantha and the family wanting to adopt her. Samantha read the complaint, corrected certain factual statements, then signed the document pro se. Without a "Next Friend", GAL, or counsel, but with the help of lay advocates from GCC, she filed the complaint with the Delaware Supreme Court. The media had been contacted in advance. Dan Rather covered the story that night. The next morning the details of her unhappy story and efforts to seek legal redress were front page in the state-wide newspaper and carried in other states. Her story was featured that same morning on ABC's Good Morning America with a live interview of Samantha.

    The Delaware Supreme Court accepted Samantha's complaint on June 2, 1998, and quickly ordered transcripts of the hearing and responses from the CPS, the mother, and the CASA. Just 17 days after filing of the complaint the high court issued an order declaring:

    It would thus appear that as a matter of statutory entitlement, under Delaware law, a child who is the subject of the termination proceedings may not institute an appeal in the child's own name. This is not to say that the child, whose very future as a member of a family unit may be in the balance, is not an interested party.... As an interested party in the termination proceedings, the child's right to be heard must be protected.... The CASA, like CPS, claims that it acted in Samantha's best interest, but that claim is open to significant doubt.... A Guardian ad Litem, if true to the role, must assume a role closer to the child's wishes, while affording the minor the benefit of the guardian's counsel and advice.(15)

    The court remanded the case for another hearing where the child would finally have a chance to be heard. But for the unique Pro Se filing by the child accompanied with local and national media, this child would probably have been victimized, as thousands of children are daily, by the "institutional immorality": a kangaroo court where her voice was never heard, much less weighed, her advocate was really her adversary, and the ruse of due process ignored like the Emperor’s nakedness by well-intended people who actually knew of the injustice but comfortably concluded nothing could be done. (For a copy of the order and/or the complaint for writ of certiorari contact this writer at (919) 856-2149.)
  • Chris B. - GAL as Potted Plant
    This writer represented Chris, or at least attempted to be his lawyer. Chris, living in North Carolina, at age 10, had been a ward of the state for six years. Chris is deaf. He was severely neglected and sexually abused by his mother and step-father. He had lived all the six years with a wonderful foster family that had other deaf children and intended to adopt him. For over ten months Chris' foster mother pleaded with the CPS and its sister agency, the local public mental health center, to get appropriate mental health treatment for Chris. Chris was showing clear signs of Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD). Yet the local public mental health center, operating under stringent managed care techniques designed to limit care and thereby costs, refused to even have Chris evaluated, much less provide treatment. When repeated intra-system advocacy at many levels failed, his foster mother publicized her pleas for mental health and legal services for Chris. Chris had a GAL attorney, known in North Carolina as an "attorney advocate", but it is undisputed that for the entire six years in foster care the "attorney advocate": 1) met only once with Chris to determine his expressed wishes and needs - and that was for approximately fifteen minutes; 2) failed to advocate to the court Chris' expressed wishes and needs; and, 3) never visited Chris' foster family home. Further, because the foster mother publicly advocated for Chris to get mental health and legal services and consulted with this writer, the "attorney advocate" for Chris filed a motion alleging the foster mother had violated the confidentiality rules and harmed the best interest of the child. The "attorney advocate" never once advocated the child's expressed desire to receive mental health assessments and treatment or his desire to be adopted by his foster family.

    This writer was contacted by the foster mother and asked to represent Chris. This writer met with Chris and a sign language interpreter out of the presence of the foster mother. Chris communicated that he wanted legal counsel to help him get treatment and get adopted by his foster family. Chris signed a retainer agreement. Compensation was not an issue because this writer is employed by Legal Services of North Carolina and Chris qualified for free representation. Notice of Appearance was filed. After full oral argument by this writer supported by an amicus brief to the trial judge from Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse and her child psychiatrist colleague who specializes in deaf children, Chris was denied the right to be heard through his retained pro bono attorney in an on-going foster care proceedings in which he had fundamental and protected rights, including the rights to safety, liberty, and health care under the Federal Medicaid law, which were being denied.

    Soon thereafter, in what appeared to be a retaliatory move against the foster mother for her public advocacy for Chris to have meaningful legal representation and appropriate mental health treatment, the CPS decided to remove Chris from the only loving family he had ever known. At approximately the same time and due to the delays and denials of mental health services and legal assistance and to protect their infant son from the ever-increasing threat of harm from Chris's untreated RAD, Chris' foster parents felt they had no choice but to withdraw their request to adopt Chris. Extraordinary Writs to appeal the denial of the right to be heard through retained pro bono counsel were denied without opinion by both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and North Carolina Supreme Court. The only opposition to these Writs were filed by the GAL, including hiring a private attorney to prepare and file a brief in opposition in the state supreme court. Chris was snatched from his family of six years and moved to another town. After several weeks he was moved once again. This writer has no idea where he is, whether he has received appropriate treatment, nor how he doing. This deaf child was truly never heard in court.
  • The Unmet Legal Needs of Children

    It is not clear what the court meant by "kangaroo court" when it stated in In re Gault that: "the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."(16) But the above examples might qualify. Gregory got heard at the trial level but was told he had no right to be heard by the appellate court. Samantha got relief at the appellate level. But for the uniqueness of her pro se complaint and the national media, she may have never prevailed. These are just some of the many, many stories of extreme injustice that can be told by the few lawyers in the trial trenches fighting for children. There are few such lawyers because most traditional Legal Services programs represent parents, not children, if their resources allow family court representation at all. Other non-profit legal groups have focused on class action litigation targeting systemic changes in the child protective systems or Medicaid health care system. Many purported child advocacy organizations actually focus on parents’ issues or help state agencies. Most children don't have the money or access to money to retain private attorneys. The economics of it all means that few lawyers are raising and litigating the basic right of access to court for children. The Supreme Court has said: "the right of access to court is the right conservative of all other rights."(17) Yet children are routinely denied this right. Worse, there is no organized, systemic campaign being waged in and out of court to expose and correct this gross injustice.

    The problem has long been recognized however. In 1979, the ABA adopted stringent standards for lawyers representing children.(18) They state: "Justice requires that all parties (including children as well as parents and other adults) subject to juvenile and family court proceedings are represented. Children and their parents (or guardians) should have independent counsel at all stages of legal proceedings concerning charges of delinquency, status offenses, and cases involving child abuse, neglect, custody and adoption, except in temporary emergencies where immediate participation of counsel cannot be arranged." (Emphasis added.) Despite the admonition in 1979 that "justice requires" representation for children when their essential interests are at stake, the ABA Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and Their Families had to report in 1993: "Our society is failing to protect its children and fails them even more once they are in crisis.... Children too frequently find themselves before courts without benefit of counsel, despite their constitutional and statutory rights to counsel in many kinds of cases."(19) Through business as usual, we have sat on our hands while the "persistent institutional immorality" continues. Our response to the plea of a National Emergency has petered out into more conferences, more meetings, more studies, and more articles but no demand for enforceable rights for children.

    Essential But Narrowly Defined Rights for Children

    The call for rights for children conjures up many fears and misconceptions. The same was true with the call for rights for African Americans and women. Remember how the Equal Rights Amendment for Women was to have us all sitting together simultaneously on toilet stools. Anyone parenting a teenager is going to have initial doubts about what appears to be open-ended calls for children’s rights. Because of the general reluctance among us to take a stand for affirmative rights for children and even dialogue about the issue, the fears not only remain inadequately addressed, but we often propagate the misconceptions. It is disheartening to read even scholarly writings about children’s rights that fail to distinguish between the basic rights of access to court and be heard when fundamental interests are at stake and the unclaimed, and inappropriate, right of a child to decide the issue.

    Other areas that generates fear are rights of religion, thought, conscience, and freedom of expression. These areas must include deference to parental direction and guidance appropriate for the child’s evolving capacities. Sorting out enforceable rights of children from areas appropriate to be left to broad parental discretion as part of parental rights is essential to build the broad based support needed to achieve legal personhood status for children. There is a huge difference between the right raised in the cases described above of a child to be heard in court and any claimed right of a child to association (with, say, substance abusing friends) or of religion (to decline to attend the parents’ church, synagogue, or temple). As to the latter "rights" to association, reasonable minds differ over the degrees, at what age appropriate, and even if such rights exists for a minor. However, the vast majority of reasonable minds are likely to understand and be supportive of the right to be heard in the cases summarized above. A small number of children’s advocates have sorted out these undeniable, inalienable rights of court access and to be heard and have been struggling for public and judicial recognition of them. However, we must broaden and deepen the discussion with the public and increase lawyer involvement in cases seeking to establish these elementary due process rights.

    University of Pennsylvania Law Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has written:

    "The current discourse, in which children’s mere ‘interests’ are easily overwhelmed by parents’ powerful ‘rights,’ entails ... problematic choices about allocating power over children and about when action or inaction constitutes state ‘intervention or ‘oppression.’ Perhaps children, as the least powerful members of both the family and the political community, are also the least dangerous of rights-bearers and the most in need of an affirmative rights rhetoric in order to be heard. By defining children’s rights as flowing from their needs, we can affirm rather than undermine an ethic of care for others. By listening to children’s voices and experiences as evidence of their needs and by trying to come to terms with the children’s reality, we can confront our own adult ambivalence and conflicts of interest regarding children’s rights."(20)

    Professor Woodhouse has captured the core ingredients of the First Stage of Rights for Children: children are entitled to due process and protective rights because of their human dignity and our ethic of care. Let the debate and progress continue with all deliberate speed concerning at what age, if any, a minor is entitled to decide clothes, bed-time, TV choices, friends, curfew, religious preference, etc. But let us not be delayed one more second in our consensus about, and vigorous efforts to establish, the most basic of legal rights: the right of access to court and to be heard through competent, loyal counsel. The corollary to the Supreme Court’s statement that the right of access to court is the right conservative of all other rights is that without the right of access to court one effectively has no other rights. These simple First Stage Rights to due process and protective rights implicate issues of standing, capacity, weakened parental rights to custody and child-rearing techniques, expressed interest representation as opposed to best interest representation and the fears and misconceptions associated with these issues. We should turn to those issues now.

    Anchoring Principles Regarding Custody

    We can agree that children need families, and that the birth parents are most likely to provide appropriate care and are entitled to raise their children. Families should not be interfered with just because someone else might "do a better job". In other words, "best interest" of the child does not automatically take precedent over parental rights and is not the routine criteria in deciding custody disputes between biological parents and third parties. In a custody dispute between the two biological parents, "best interest" is always the criteria used.

    However, we believe that respect for the human dignity of the child requires limiting the rights of birth parents by considering the child’s "best interest" as paramount in rare, extraordinary circumstances. There are only two such circumstances:

    • Where birth parents are abusive, neglectful or have abandoned the child, parental rights are balanced by notions of the best interest of the child. Every state has laws that recognize this principle and these laws are not vulnerable to constitutional challenge by parents. How the law and facts are interpreted by any specific court may be unfair to the child, but this principle is undisputed.

    • Where a child has little or no relationship with the biological parents because the child has been in the long term custody of third parties and the removal would impose significant trauma to the child, parental rights should be balanced by notions of the best interest of the child. Several states recognize this principle through statute or case law.(21)

    In other words, if Uncle Joe, who is bright, kind, and wealthy, wants to litigate to obtain custody of his niece, his existing relationship with her determines whether "best interest of the child" is the criteria to be used by the court. If he has the normal uncle/niece relationship, i.e., he has not had custody such as described in #2 above, then the fact that he can afford better clothes, a bigger, nicer house, and a top notch college education for her is not even relevant. In fact, Uncle Joe probably doesn’t even have standing to initiate a court proceeding in which he can ask for custody unless one or both of he above extraordinary circumstances exist. If abandonment, abuse, or neglect are alleged, then "best interest" is the criteria. But Uncle Joe cannot simply allege that his parenting skills are better and have " best interest" be the criteria. The Elian Gonzales case is an example of viewing these issues through the eyes of adults rather than from the perspective of the child. Elian’s is a painful example of adults playing politics with a child’s life.

    Therefore, nothing in the First Stage of children’s rights should cause anyone to fear that the more wealthy folks will be able to "take" children from the less wealthy. Nor do the First Stage rights violate the constitutional rights of parents. The routine divorce case where one parent is denied custody illustrates that there is no absolute constitutional right to have custody of your child. Likewise, the nationwide acceptance of exception #1 above further illustrates that parents do not have an absolute constitutional right to custody of their children. In fact, probably no right is "absolute." The courts routinely balance competing rights. The First Stage rights for children simply means that children experiencing either of the two situations described above (abuse, neglect, abandonment, or long term custody with a 3rd party resulting in a bond) are entitled to be recognized as human beings. As "persons", children are entitled to have their rights balanced against the asserted rights of biological parents to custody. The criteria for the courts to decide this balancing of interests is "best interest of the child." To effectuate this recognition of human dignity, children must have the right of court access and to be heard through counsel.

    In other words, there is a presumption that biological parents can and should have custody of their children. However, this is a refutable presumption, meaning it can be challenged. Otherwise, the child would be treated as property owned by the parent(s).

    It is really not a new or radical concept. However, it has generated much fear and consternation. In fact, it seems that lawyers and judges have a harder time recognizing children as rights-bearing "persons" than the general public. Three reasons for these fears and misconceptions are discussed below.

    Three Fears and Misconceptions About Children’s Rights of Access to Court and to Be Heard

    1. 1.  Confusing the Right To Be Heard and Access to Court with the Unilateral Right of the Child To Decide the Issue:
      The First Stage of rights is premised on the ethic of care for the child and asserts the right of the child to have her/his basic interests/needs presented to the court and recognized as relevant. This seems too fundamental to be in question. But in the nationally profiled cases (involving allegedly defective adoptions proceedings and the forced removal of the child after bonding with the adoptive parents) of Baby Jessica and Baby Richard, their "best interest" was deemed by three state Supreme Courts not to be relevant.(22) Expert testimony as to irreparable harm likely to occur from forced removal was deemed inadmissible. The child should have the right of access to court since he/she is the real party in interest. In other words, the child is the person who gains or loses the most - their childhood, their attachment to a caretaker, and possibly their life, in a TPR proceeding - depending upon the wisdom of the custody decision. Yet constantly children are ruled not to have "standing" to bring a legal action seeking court protection from abuse or seeking removal from the limbo of foster care into a permanent loving home. Gregory K was told by the Florida Court of Appeals that he had no "standing" to seek court protection even though all his allegations were found to be true. A child should be able to knock at the courthouse door seeking protection and have that knock answered.

      The First Stage does not contend that the child has the right to decide the issues. The judge, hopefully consistent with the rules of procedure and evidence, makes the decision after hearing from all the parties. Yet the refrain that we advocate "the child’s right to divorce her/his parents" implies the child need simply check the "divorce" box on some legal form and leave home as a matter of "right." It is remarkable how frequently lawyers and judges initially fail to make this distinction between right to decide and right to be heard.

    2. 2. Confusing the Narrowly Defined Right of Access to Court, Status as a Party, and the Right to Representation with the Notion that Children Have the Right to Open-Ended Litigation Over Matters Rightfully Considered Within Parental Judgment.
      Children’s rights are not unbounded. In matters of abuse, neglect, abandonment, and custody children should have the opportunity to be heard through counsel regarding their specific interests, needs, and preferences. (Remember from above, not the right to decide, but the right to be heard.) This has been the position of the American Bar Association since 1979 - so the First Stage of Rights is not breaking new ground or being radical. It is just trying to make the theory also the practice.

      The rights listed above are narrowly tailored to give the child protection. These are protective rights. They do not in any way encroach upon "parental rights" to decide bed time, chores, punishment, religion, whether to purchase the latest computer game or the latest $170 pair of Nike sneakers. This is consistent with the Anchoring Principles above. Even if a child initiates an action such as Gregory K did, it is still only to allege a denial of basic needs, such as a timely, safe, loving, permanent home.

      In the unlikely circumstance that a lawyer was looney enough to file a suit over the failure to provide Nike shoes or the existence of an "unfair" bed time, the judge would have the power to immediately dismiss. The judge could even sanction the lawyer for bringing a frivolous suit if appropriate. Giving children the right to be heard regarding the four specific areas of protective rights/basic needs ( abuse, abandonment, neglect, and custody) is not going to open a flood gate of lawsuits challenging the basic rights of parents to raise their children as they choose.

    3. 3.  Confusing the Common Law Concept that Children Are Incompetent and Lack Capacity with the Very Different Issue of Their Right to Due Process Essential to Insuring Fairness in Any Court Fact-Finding Process and to Protect Their Life and Liberty.
      The ancient legal concept of minors as infants and incompetents, even if 15, 16, or 17 years old, is intended as a shield to protect children from their immaturity and vulnerability. Children are not able to unilaterally enter into a contract with a door-to-door salesman for $2000 worth of encyclopedias. The contract would be deemed by the court to be void because the child did not have the capacity to enter into it.

      This doctrine is sound as long as it is being used as a shield to protect children. It is obviously illogical to allow the doctrine to become a sword against the child. Yet that is exactly what happened when the Florida court told Gregory K that it could not answer his pleading knock at their courthouse door seeking help because he was only a child and had no capacity to knock.

      Probably every state has already modified this old legal concept when appropriate to protect children. For example, every state recognizes that a minor has the capacity to be named as a respondent in a Petition alleging delinquency; to have the capacity to have legal counsel in such proceedings and capacity to waive basic rights such as the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and waive the right to trial. Most states recognize a child’s capacity to contract for the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter. Others recognize a child’s right to contract for an education. This means the child is held to the terms of the contract and must pay the bill just as an adult would. Given these existing adjustments of the common law capacity notion, it is certainly reasonable to modify the old concept and recognize the child as having the capacity to be a party in court and have an attorney in the four narrowly tailored areas described above. Children are entitled to this due process protection to insure that judicial findings of fact and law are fair and just. It is absurd to think that the person most affected by the court decision, the child, is being protected by a concept that holds that she/he cannot be present and heard in the proceeding.

      The point is not to abolish the existing concepts or principles of law that shield and protect children. But certainly those concepts cannot be allowed to hurt children more than they help. Telling children that they are incompetent and must go find an adult to knock on the courthouse door for them is simply putting another obstacle in the way of justice; especially, when the adult most likely to go to court in their behalf is frequently told she/he has no "standing" to bring the matter to court either. Often grandparents or adoptive parents are turned away by the court with this legal ploy. If the child cannot bring the action and the most involved adult(s) cannot either, it is like playing a shell game with no pea.

      Most every state has a Rule of Professional Conduct that addresses and approves representation of a minor despite the capacity issue. The Rule expressly recognizes attorney representation of minors, even if they lack the ability to make adequately considered decisions. In North Carolina, for example, Rule 1.14 is titled "Client under a disability." It reads in full:

      (a) When a client’s ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.

      (b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action with respect to a client only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest. (Emphasis added.)

      The Comment section to this Rule states: "Furthermore, to an increasing extent, the law recognizes intermediate degrees of competence. For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning their custody."

      The due process denial stemming from the long habit of denying children traditional attorney-client representation is not a newly discovered issue. The In re Gault decision considered the history and good intentions behind the juvenile court system and firmly ruled that the good intentions of adults were not an adequate substitute for due process for minors. The reasoning of In re Gault is worth considering fully, even though it dealt with delinquency rather than abuse, neglect, and custody. The court noted that the juvenile court system was designed with the good intention of not having an adversary hearing so as to be consistent with the state’s parens patriae role and the rehabilitative, rather than punitive, intent.

      The Court wrote:

      The Latin phrase (parens patriae) proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. . . .

      The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right ‘not to liberty but to custody.' He can be made to attend to his parents, to go to school, etc. If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions -- that is, if the child is "delinquent" -- the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the "custody" to which the child is entitled. On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as "civil" not "criminal" and therefore not subject to the requirements which restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty... .

      Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is -- to say the least -- debatable. And in practice . . . the results have not been entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.  In 1937, Dean Pound wrote: "The powers of the Star Chamber were at rifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts . . . ." Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness. . . .

      Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure." But in addition, the procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data. "Procedure is to law what 'scientific method' is to science." ...

      . . . The observance of due process standards, intelligently and no truthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process.  But it is important, we think, that the claimed benefits of the juvenile process should be candidly appraised. Neither sentiment nor folklore should cause us to shut our eyes. . . . .

      . . . The features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication.(23)

    To make concrete the Court’s maxim "procedure is to law what scientific method is to science," we need only examine in detail the key issue in the case of Chris B., described above: the constitutionally significant difference between a child having an attorney with the traditional ethical duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation as opposed to having an attorney with the very different ethical duty of advocating "best interest."

    Distinctions Between Traditional Counsel and
       GAL Representation

    The ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases define the "child’s attorney" as follows: "The term child’s attorney means a lawyer who provides legal services for a child who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due an adult client." The Commentary then adds: "These Standards explicitly recognize that the child is a separate individual with potentially discrete and independent views. To ensure that the child’s voice is heard, the child’s attorney must advocate the child’s articulated position...As with any client, the child’s attorney may counsel against the pursuit of a particular position sought by the child."

    The ABA Standards then define "Lawyer Appointed as Guardian Ad Litem:" "A lawyer appointed as ‘guardian ad litem’ for a child is an officer of the court appointed to protect the child’s interest without being bound by the child’s expressed preferences." The Commentary then adds: "...The chief distinguishing factor between the roles is the manner and method to be followed in determining the legal position to be advocated. While a guardian ad litem should take the child’s point of view into account, the child’s preferences are not binding, irrespective of the child’s age and the ability or willingness of the child to express preferences." All across our nation on a daily basis this fundamental distinction and its ramifications are unnoticed or ignored.(24) It is therefore worth going into considerable detail to explicate the impact on children using Chris as an example. Chris was denied pro bono traditional representation because representation by a GAL attorney was deemed comparable. The North Carolina Guardian ad Litem Division, a division of the Administrative Office of the Courts, tries to provide each child involved in abuse and neglect proceedings a lay advocate (a volunteer) who is represented by an "Attorney Advocate" (a staff attorney). The program, while a good GAL model, is overwhelmed by the shortage of funds and volunteers. In materials prepared for a Continuing Legal Education Seminar sponsored by the Juvenile Justice and Child Rights Section of the N.C. Bar Association in October, 1998, the Program’s statewide director wrote:

    Guardian ad Litem legal advocacy differs significantly from traditional attorney-client advocacy. The GAL advocates for the best interest of the client, which may or may not be the same as the client’s expressed wishes. This type of legal advocacy is known as "best interest" representation. In child protection cases, the GAL substitutes his or her own judgment for that of the minor client..... In a system where both a lawyer and volunteer are appointed, they both stand together in the shoes of the child, and are permitted to substitute their judgments as to what is best for the child.... In child protection advocacy someone must assume the responsibilities of the client in relationship with the attorney. Someone must make decisions about the purposes and objectives of the GAL/AA legal advocacy and how to achieve those ends. The child-client cannot make those decisions. As the GAL and AA stand together in the shoes of the child client, the AA must necessarily look to the GAL to assume some of the responsibilities that a client would fulfill in the traditional-client relationship.... If an attorney represents the wishes of a child then the traditional "attorney-client relationship" rules apply... The attorney’s role may determine whether a child’s communication with the attorney are privileged. ... In order to determine the issue of privilege, we begin with an examination of what or who is being represented. In 7A-586 the statute mandates that the guardian ad litem and attorney represent the "best interest of the child." This best interest is defined and created by law. Therefore, one could say that it is a legal fiction---an "it". The attorney is not assigned to represent the child’s wishes, but rather to represent what is deemed to be in the best interest of the child. This "legal fiction" is not too distinct from the legal fiction that is created by the existence of a corporation. A corporation has no life but exists as a creature of law. It is an "it." The guardian ad litem and the attorney advocate have the same duty in the representation of best interests... There is no law on the point but the comparison makes sense in the nebulous world in which guardian ad litem and attorney advocate operate.(25)

    A Child Is A Rights-Bearing Person, Not An "It"

    It could not be more clear: a child is a rights-bearing person, not a "legal fiction," not a "corporation," and not an "it." In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, the Supreme Court wrote: "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."(26) Even prior to that the court had written in Wisconsin v. Yoder: "These children are ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. We have so held over and over again."(27) Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In the famous arm band case, Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., the court stated: Children are persons and "possessed of fundamental rights which the state must respect."(28) Further, the U.S. Constitution and all state constitutions have language declaring that each "person" shall have the right to due process and equal protection of the law.

    The appointed "Attorney Advocate" for Chris charged with the radically different duty, albeit important and beneficial to the child, of representing the "it" (best interest) cannot be deemed equivalent to traditional "counsel" for the person. Federal and state due process prohibit equating the two. To hold otherwise is to treat children as property; as "things" with no opinions, desires or wishes worthy of consideration.

    The U.S. Supreme Court has stressed the fundamental nature of the right of court access to our form of government: "The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative to force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship...."(29)

    Impact on Chris B. of Denial of Counsel

    Not only does the "Attorney Advocate" in lieu of traditional counsel deprive children of due process and equal protection, it distorts the operation of the judicial system when a child is denied individual representation. As Chris’ case illustrates, reliance on the "Attorney Advocate" system means that issues are not fully explored and legal arguments are not presented. Silencing the minor by depriving him/her of court access or of representation by counsel obstructs the adversary process and, therefore, the truth-finding process. The "Attorney Advocate" adopted a policy of not communicating with Chris and of obstructing him in his efforts to communicate with the Court. The "Attorney Advocate" ignored or disagreed with Chris’ desire for immediate adoption. His "Attorney Advocate" failed to make a motion or marshal the law and evidence supporting Chris’ protected liberty interest in his existing family unit which existed for six years. The "Attorney Advocate" did not move for a permanency hearing and adoption plan - even though all parental rights had long been terminated. Nor did she present to the court the compelling arguments for additional Medicaid guaranteed mental health treatment for Chris and his hoped-for-adoptive family. Nor did she present to the Court the many compelling arguments for insuring that Chris’ care giver and de facto parent of six years be able to give and get feedback on Chris’ treatment needs and progress. Had traditional, vigorous representation of Chris’ expressed wishes been allowed, this child might not have suffered the trauma of being removed from the only loving family and home he ever had. Without traditional counsel to put forward Chris’s needs and interests, the fact-finding process was defective and resulted in a gross injustice.

    Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged the harm to a child stemming from a defective fact-finding process:

    The child has an interest in the outcome of the fact-finding hearing independent of that of the parent. To be sure, ‘the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.’ But the child’s interest in a continuation of the family unit exists only to the extent that such a continuation would not be harmful to him. An error in the fact-finding hearing that results in a failure to terminate a parent-child relationship which rightfully should be terminated may well detrimentally affect the child.(30)

    That Chris was "detrimentally affected" is an understatement: he suffered re-abuse from his step-father because of the system’s misguided attempts at reunification. He suffered by the system’s failure to have terminated parental rights quickly. He suffered by being left "double parked" in state custody as a foster child for six years and being denied a permanent home He was traumatized when moved from his home of the last six years to another "placement." He was then re-traumatized when moved again. He probably assumes this writer abandoned him thereafter since his new placement/location were withheld under the scam of "confidentiality."

    Kelly & Ramsey, in their article entitled Do Attorneys for Children in Protection Proceedings Make a Difference? - A Study of the Impact of Representation Under Conditions of High Judicial Intervention, sum up the reality faced by Chris and most court-involved children:

    Representation seemed to be a token affair, a mere procedural requirement with attorneys serving as a rubber stamp for the recommendation of the department of social services. This kind of system gives the illusion that abused and neglected children have their own advocate when in fact they do not.(31)

    Or, as the 1993 ABA Report of Children at Risk put it: "Even when children are represented, the representation they receive is sometimes inadequate. Children’s cases are often ‘processed’, not advocated, and too frequently children’s interests are poorly represented."(32)

    Evolving First Stage Rights for Children

    That a child should have the rights of court access and to be heard through traditional counsel whenever he/she has significant interests at state seems undeniable. But such rights are denied routinely and frequently. We must firmly establish these rights and their full implementation in all courts. We must also establish substantive rights for children, for example to escape an abusive family or to oppose ill-conceived efforts to break up a family. Currently children qualified under Medicaid have the best health insurance policy money could buy - on paper that is. The Federal Medicaid statute creates a separate program for the "Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment" (EPSDT) of Medicaid recipients under the age of 21. These services are mostly preventative. The services promised include a comprehensive medical history, physical examination, immunization, laboratory services and health education. Mental health, vision, dental, and hearing services are mandatory. In addition, the state must offer "such other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the state plan."(33) All of the few lawyers who practice in this area know that denials and inappropriate levels of care are the norm, not the exception. The Medicaid system for children suffers from budget deficits implemented through managed care techniques. Every child, not just those poor enough to qualify for Medicaid, should be entitled to appropriate health care. Lawyers must be trained, available, and paid to fight for these basic rights.

    Similarly, the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act promises every child a free appropriate public education. If a child is identified with a disability, the school system is required to develop, along with the parent(s), an Individual Education Plan for the child providing tailor made aids, supports, and services to accommodate the child’s learning needs as much as possible. Again, all of the few lawyers who practice in this field know that huge numbers of disabled children are denied appropriate services. Again, lack of adequate funding at the local, state, and federal level is a primary cause - followed closely by a lack of moral outrage by those of us aware of this institutional immorality.

    One can easily see that undiagnosed or diagnosed but inadequately treated disabilities in children have a direct impact on juvenile delinquency. The Mental Health Unit of Legal Services of North Carolina, as have a few other organizations, has developed a delinquency court an advocacy concept to redress denial of appropriate treatment services for youth. The crack in the system through which children fall arises because the appointed lawyer for the child in a delinquency proceeding, even though serving in the role of traditional counsel and not "best interest" representation, often does not have the training, and usually will not be paid for the time necessary, to address the denial of Medicaid mental health services and/or special education services. Appeal of the denial of either of these services necessitates initiation of proceedings in an entirely different forum from the delinquency court, such as the state’s office of Administrative Hearings or Federal District Court. Appointed counsel rarely, if ever, take these steps. These needs of the child fall through the cracks. As a result, the pattern of misbehavior continues or increases and so does the probability of out of home and community placement, such as "training school." This costs more and frequently puts the child on a track of institutionalization, including prison.

    Our project, Health Education and Advocacy Link (HEAL), takes referrals from the delinquency system (the court, the court counselor, or defense attorney) when a child is red-flagged as having undiagnosed or untreated mental health, special education issues, or placement issues. HEAL represents the child, not the parent, in the capacity of traditional counsel. We become the civil lawyer for the child and do not represent the child on the delinquency petition, even though providing input on disposition is an essential role for the HEAL attorney. After two years, we have seen a average of 4 positive outcomes (creation of an IEP, provision of appropriate mental health services, remaining in the home or community, etc.) per child represented by the HEAL Project. The delinquency court judges embrace the HEAL Program because they too see daily the denial of necessary services to children that contribute to delinquent behavior. HEAL representation takes those issues out of their court rooms and the judges get to dodge the issue of whether appointed counsel defending the petition could/should provide representation on the denial of services issues and submit fee petitions for all such attorney time spent. The Project HEAL case load must be small because the cases are very time consuming. Not all referrals can be accepted. HEAL operates with one staff attorney in one huge county of North Carolina. Children in the other 99 counties have no such opportunity for lawyers to help them get needed services. This concept, or some variation, is needed for every court involved child in the nation. But just like Head Start, which is indisputably a wise, humane, and cost-saving investment in children, the Bar, Judiciary, and elected leadership of the nation lack the moral outrage and political will to insure adequate money is appropriated for such services.

    Our national child welfare Establishment implicitly recognizes a child’s right to food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care. If parents fail to provide such basic needs, the CPS can and should take appropriate action, including bringing a petition alleging neglect or dependency. Yet the wide-spread failure of the system to meaningfully provide these services, even when the state has taken custody of the child, is ignored despite it being labeled a decade ago a "national emergency" and "institutional immorality." Given all the research and studies about early childhood development and its impact on behavior and violence, our failure to devote whatever resources necessary, both human and capital, to insure no child is denied basic needs is truly a moral outrage. Children, the intended beneficiaries of the right to these services, should be able to initiate proceedings through their own real lawyers to create and enforce their right to developmentally critical services. Barriers of standing, capacity, access to free lawyers paid adequately and trained to do a competent, vigorous job must be identified, exposed publicly, and removed immediately. The legal process can then begin to develop a rich body of case law and procedure intended to serve the needs of our nations children. The goal is not lawyers; lawyers are the means to the goal of meeting the basic needs of children.

    The tireless and brilliant civil rights lawyer Arthur Kinoy gives us a glimpse of the role the Bar could play in this challenging and exciting opportunity to go beyond rhetoric to rights for children. Professor Kinoy, writing in 1969, was addressing how the legal profession could remain relevant to the contemporary social problems of the nation. Referring to the African American civil rights struggle, of which he was an integral part, he wrote:

    There are in this country today many lawyers, young and old, who are beginning to participate in the exciting search for answers to the ever-pressing question of the relevancy of law and the legal profession to the central issues of the day. It is no coincidence that it was out of the Southern black movements of the early 1960's that a new insight into the role of the lawyer began to develop among lawyers and law students alike: a recognition that a lawyer could place his or her full skills and talents at the service of people’s struggle for the achievement of the American promises of equality, freedom, justice, and peace. Today, unlike the first days of the Southern struggles, from one end of the country to the other, there are hundreds and hundreds of lawyers attempting to fulfill this role. They are a new breed of lawyer, with deep roots in the honored past of our profession, who I would characterize as people’s lawyers. And as they work and struggle to fulfill this concept of their vision of the lawyers’ role - to place the full skill and art of their profession at the service of ever-growing movements of people searching for solutions to the overwhelming social problems of our era - a body of legal experience develops, a body of knowledge, concepts, theories, and experiences which constitutes, in a certain sense, a new body of law. This new body of law for want of a better term, I would call the area of ‘people’s law’.... I would suggest that the law schools must capture, if they are to overcome the deadly symptoms of the fundamental malaise that inflicts us all, the excitement of the new challenge of making law serve the needs of people in struggle as well as continuing to fulfill the needs of corporations and the business community."(34)

    Hillary Rodham Clinton continued the call in 1992: "We must start changing our profession’s priorities. The law, the lawyers, and the judges protecting our families deserve at least the respect now given to the law, lawyers, and judges protecting our corporate boardrooms."(35)

    A Constitutional Amendment for Children

    The parallels between the struggle for fair treatment and due process for African Americans, women, and children includes the need to put children in our federal constitution. Our constitution is grounded in what Justice Brennan called the "Equality Principle" reflecting the supremacy of the human dignity of every individual. It is in this sacred document that we state in general terms the values, protections, and promises of fundamental fairness and equality that embody the noble goals of a great nation. The theory - practice gap between our promises has been shortened by the struggles of African Americans and women who have specifically relied upon constitutional terms and interpretations needed to insure their status as rights-bearing persons. The post-Civil War Amendments and the Women’s Suffrage Amendment, and even the national dialogue generated by the unsuccessful Equal Rights Amendment, have served to further the recognition of all adult persons as full human being entitled to equal dignity and respect. The maltreatment of children in our nation, including their legal status as akin to that of property, gives rise to the need for a constitutional amendment establishing and anchoring in the practice of law our rhetoric about their treasured status.

    At least seventy-nine nations mention children in their constitutions. The United States does not. Hence, as Connecticut Superior Court Judge Charles D. Gill put it: "It is ironic that, although corporations in the United States have long been held to be "persons," and thus eligible for constitutional protection, the extent to which children, as individuals, have comparable constitutional rights is still not entirely clear."(36) Chief Justice A.J. Toal of the South Carolina Supreme Court put it this way in her 1993 dissent in a case involving reunification of a child with a biological parent who had previously harmed the child:

    The majority’s focus is solely on the rights of the Mother. No consideration is given to the child’s interests or rights. Nor does the majority acknowledge the State’s urgent interest in the welfare of the child.... Assuming the child’s interest is best served by keeping the family unit intact at this point ignores the very nature of the proceeding and the findings of the previous hearing. If the child’s interest are not adequately provided for by the procedure, and I would opine based upon the majority’s interpretation of our statute they are not, a change is in order. As noted above, the state of the child in this country and this state is a disgrace. The parents are protected to the utmost extent but the children, who cannot reasonably offer any protection of their own, are ignored. If our state and federal constitutions do not protect our children from abuse and an unstable family life in their formative years, then they should be amended so that they do."(37)

    Continuing her dissent, Justice Toal then referred to Judge Gill’s excellent Law Review article which, she wrote, "exposes the desperate situation children find themselves in because of this country’s biological bias."(38) Judge Gill has been working tirelessly for nearly 10 years to improve the condition of our nation’s children through passage of a constitutional amendment. On October 18, 1997 twenty children’s advocates from the fields of medicine, education, and law met in Washington, DC to draft such an amendment. After extensive pre-meeting preparation and a full day of drafting, the following working draft was developed:

    "The rights of person under the age of 18 years shall include all the due process and protective rights possessed by those over the age of 18 years. Such rights may be limited only upon demonstration of a compelling state interest, and any such limitation shall be accomplished by the least intrusive means. Nothing herein shall be construed to diminish any rights of person under the age of 18 years, nor to preclude the enhancement of rights of such persons."

    A conscious decision was made by the group not to include an itemized wish list for children, such as health care, education, etc. It was agreed that a more general statement of principle regarding due process and protective rights, to be developed and defined by case law as most other rights have been, would have the best chance of passage. Top ranking leadership from the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Association of School Administrators (representing 18,000 school superintendents) were present and in agreement. Both organizations support the amendment as written, but neither is woodenly attached to this precise wording. Improvements are welcomed.

    The process of organizing around a constitutional amendment is both a legal and political strategy. In the process public education can be done generating broad public support for overcoming the "institutional immorality" and child-as-property status of children. The process itself is a goal. A federal amendment for children is certainly the ideal, however, local efforts to amendment state constitutions may be more feasible. Regardless of one’s view on whether or not passage of an amendment can in fact occur, engaging in national or statewide discussions about these issues would help build the popular support necessary for positive action. Similar to the civil rights struggles of the past, the moral issues exposed in the denial of basic human dignity faced by children are powerful galvanizing forces. Just as it did for Women and African Americans, the process of seeking a constitutional amendment setting forth simple anchoring principles of human rights and values, and making them statements and commitments of the national will, can quantitatively further the cause of justice for children.

    Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)

    The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), like a constitutional amendment, is an agreement to begin a process for improving the lives of children and families. It is a shared global statement of directions and goals for bettering lives of children. The CRC has 41 substantive articles that create an international, almost universally recognized, framework for government policies regarding the protection and well-being of children. The procedural articles establish an international body (called the Committee on the Rights of the Child) to monitor implementation by states parties. This body has no enforcement power and can only issue reports on compliance and rely on moral and public pressure to create better policies for children. The United States was active in the 10 year drafting process leading to the CRC being adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 20, 1989. By 1998, 193 nations had ratified the Convention, more than any other treaty in history and in the shortest time. Only the US and Somalia have failed to ratify the Convention. Somalia has an excuse: it is precluded from participation because it currently does not have the governmental capacity to ratify an international treaty. The US has no excuse.

    The US signed the CRC in 1995 indicating our intention to consider ratification. President Clinton said he would submit it to the Senate for ratification as soon as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women was ratified. In 1997 Senator Jesse Helms wrote to then Ambassador Madeline Albright warning Clinton not to include the CRC on his list of treaties to be ratified. Despite widespread support within the US from hundreds of groups, Helms has accepted the mythology that the CRC undermines parental rights and surrenders our national sovereignty to "World Government." The President has the option of submitting the CRC to the Senate for it’s "advice and consent" with a Statement of Reservations, Understandings and Declarations (RUDs). These RUDs allow any country to clarify language in the treaty and reject any part of the treaty contrary to US law or policy. Clinton has yet to even submit the CRC to the Senate for discussion. One objection to the CRC is that it would require the United States to promise not to execute children below the age now allowed in many US states. Once again, adult politics has taken precedence over protection of children.

    The CRC calls for freedom from violence, abuse, hazardous employment, exploitation, abduction or sale; it calls for equal treatment regardless of gender, race or cultural background, adequate nutrition, free compulsory primary education, adequate health care, the right to express opinions and freedom of thought in matters affecting children; it calls for safe exposure/access to leisure, play, culture, and art. The CRC repeatedly underscores the primary role and the authority of parents and makes its rights contingent on the child’s age and evolving capacities. The CRC creates no right for anybody, much less the UN, to sue parents, the state, or federal government. However, there is a requirement that each ratifying nation submit a written report on progress in achieving the goals of the Convention. Non-governmental organizations are encouraged to submit written comments on the nation’s progress. Is our nation afraid of the international community learning of our "institutional immorality" in the way we treat our children?

    Despite the lack of enforcement power, ratification is not an empty act. Just as a constitutional amendment is an act of commitment of and to the nation, the act of commitment to the international community by joining in the goals and vision of the CRC is itself vastly important.(39) Of course both the constitutional amendment and the CRC will require on-going grassroots support to get them passed/ratified and meaningfully implemented. But both, if approached properly, serve precisely as such organizing and public education tools that can hold the nation’s feet to the fire on its rhetoric about valuing children. Linking the demands for a constitutional amendment and the CRC is extremely important. They flow together as national and international promises and pledges to accord all children the core, elementary status as fully sacred human beings.

    Conclusion: A Crusade for Children

    Once the Greek philosopher Thucydides was asked when justice would come to Athens. He answered: "Justice will not come until those who are not injured are as indignant as those who are injured." Unfortunately, our collective consciousness, manifested through our government, our culture, out institutions, and our individual selves, is not sufficiently indignant or morally outraged over the maltreatment of children. We are in denial. We pretend that our business as usual approach is achieving incremental improvement sufficient to be "adequate." How many of the groups and activities "for" children that you see reflected in the conferences, brochures, academic gatherings, and newsletters really tackle the systemic causes of the "institutional immorality?"

    The cause of our denial is real enough. Lots of money is needed to pay for the needs of children created by our market economy which inevitably creates winners and losers: child care, health care, transportation, child protective services, quality public education for all children, decent living wages for parents with work hours that allow quality parenting, and decent living wages for child care workers, teachers, social workers, juvenile court counselors, and police officers, to name just a few. We need money to redress racial inequality. And yes, money is needed to pay lawyers to do high quality litigation seeking to establish "person" status for children and their inherent rights to the basic necessities of life. We need money for judges, court personnel, and courtrooms to hear in a timely manner children’s cases.

    You cannot meaningfully discuss the need for such increased appropriations for children without addressing the campaign finance system whereby private wealth from approximately 1% of the population accounts for 90% of all political contributions. That small elite group of "players" buy public policy that serves their personal and corporate needs (tax breaks, preferences, exclusions, exemptions, subsidies, inducement packages for corporations to locate, etc.) Then we and the children are inevitably told there isn’t enough money to fully fund Head Start; to fully implement the promises of Medicaid services; to pay teachers and have small classrooms. The number of children living in poverty in the United States is more than double that of any other industrialized nation. We all know it. But we aren’t outraged enough to be that political about advocating for children. We dare not raise hell about the rich getting richer at the expense of the majority; about the need for tax transfer policies that force corporations and those made wealthy by them to pay a fair share towards basic needs for our children. So we deny and pretend the Emperor has on the latest Fifth Avenue attire and that our business as usual is enough. Meanwhile the misery index piles up.

    As community leaders, professionals, and simply concerned citizens we have a duty to unsettle and stir up those who are complacent and in denial. We must comfort the afflicted and afflict the comforted. Redressing the needs of our children should not be a political issue: As Jesse Jackson put it in 1989: "The critical issue is no left-wing or right-wing, it is the moral center.... How we treat children in the dawn of life, and how we treat old people in the sunset of life, are measures of our character."

    We must do as the Civil Rights Movement did: we must act with the courage and moral outrage in line with the injustice at hand. As Marian Wright Edelman, of the Children’s Defense Fund, noted a decade ago: "The 1990's will be an era of struggle for the American conscience and future. And people of faith have to be moral guerillas." A few years later, her husband, Peter Edelman, resigned his ranking position in President Clinton’s Department of Health and Human Services because of Clinton’s support for the so-called Welfare Reform law, disingenuously labeled the "Personal Responsibility Act", which was estimated to throw a million children into poverty. This is the type of personal commitment and crusade attitude that is needed.

    We can also learn from the Civil Rights Movement to take a stand in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Look at the audacity of the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Sit-ins started in Greensboro, North Carolina. We can change the electoral campaign finance system and insure that our branches of government are filled with true "representatives" of the People and not simply agents of the wealthy. We can get the support and money needed to give every child a safe, permanent home.

    Yes, this is an unabashed appeal to our patriotism and our duty to straighten our civic backbone and fight. Susan B. Anthony said: "Careful, cautious people always casting about to preserve their reputation and social status, can never bring about reform." Frederick Douglass raised the same point much earlier: "Those who profess to favor freedom and deprecate agitation are people who want crops without plowing the ground; they want rain without thunder and lightening... Power concedes nothing without a demand and struggle, it never has and it never will."

    If each of us takes a stand on this bi-partisan issue and manifests that stand with the resoluteness appropriate to the crisis, we will achieve a qualitatively better quality of life for all children. But the determining factor is whether we muster the moral outrage to act collectively pursuant to the constitutional promise of self-government. Using protected First Amendment activity, as did the Civil Rights Movement, we must act out " a little rebellion, now and then," as Thomas Jefferson encouraged.

    Martin Luther King correctly pointed out that: "Pessimism is a chronic disease. It destroys the red corpuscles of hope and slows down the powerful heartbeat of positive action." The Paradox of People Power is that the moment you cease to believe you have that sovereign power, you lose it. Democracy is not a spectator sport; it is not something you have, but something, like love and theology, you DO. For, as Dr. King said, "The ultimate tragedy is not the brutality of the bad people but the silence of the good."

    Our challenge is to establish the forums and opportunities to collectively nourish the missing moral outrage and convert it into positive, bold, and creative action aimed at eradication the systemic causes of child poverty and maltreatment. Recognizing children as rights-bearing persons entitled to access to court and meaningful legal representation is one important aspect of this challenge.


     

    REFERENCES & NOTES:

    1. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429,30 (1963): "In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resoling private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state, and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression.... And under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances."

    2. This report is entitled "Child Abuse and Neglect: Critical first Steps in Response to a National Emergency" and may be obtained from the US Government Printing Office as stock no. 017-092-001045-5.

    3. "Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children and Families", Final Report of the National Commission on Children at page 84.

    4. But note that in contrast to the 2 million dollar cost to society of each child who is grossly incompetently parented, competent parents contribute 1 million dollars in gain for society for each child they raise. This is not counting the expense of crime such as loss of property, medical costs to victims, law enforcement costs or costs for prosecution and defense. Licensing Parents: Can We Prevent Child Abuse and Neglect?, by Jack C. Westman, M.D., Insight Books, Plenum Press, New York and London (1994). This is a profound book.

    5. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 476 (1856).

    6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

    7. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

    8. Bradwell v. Illiniois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).

    9. One researcher found that "from Roman times to the mid-nineteenth century children were treated as something akin to property and had rights which might be characterized as falling somewhere between those of slaves and those of animals." Cohen, Relationships Between the Child, the Family, and the State, in PERSPECTIVE ON THE FAMILY 293 (M. Bayles, R. Soffit & J. Grebe, eds. (1990)).

    10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,13, 26 (1967).

    11. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,74 (1976).

    12. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1994).

    13. For a detailed recounting of the case and splendid analysis of the legal issues, see Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K.": A Child's Rights to Be Heard, Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 27 No. 3, Fall 1993 by George Russ, Esq. Mr. Russ and his wife adopted Gregory.

    14. Grissom v. Grissom, 886 S. W. 2d 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).

    15. Unpublished Order by Chief Justice Veasey and Justices Walsh and Holland of Supreme Court of Delaware decided June 19, 1998, Case No. 234, 1998.

    16. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26.

    17. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142 (1907).

    18. IJA/ABA, Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties (1980).

    19. ABA Report: "American's Children at Risk", Executive Summary, page ix. (1993).

    20. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights: The Child's Voice in Defining the Family," BYU Journal of Public Law, Vol. 8, p.321,327.

    21. New York's highest court dealt with this issue in 1976 saying there had been a "shifting of emphasis" in the case law reflecting "more the modern principle that a child is a person, and not a subperson over which the parent has an absolute possessory interest." Bennet v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281; North Carolina's Supreme Court recently held: "However, conduct inconsistent with the parent's protected status, which need not rise to the statutory level warranting termination of parental rights (cites to statute omitted), would result in application of the 'best interest of the child' test without offending the Due Process Clause. Unfitness, neglect, and abandonment clearly constitute conduct inconsistent with the protected status parents may enjoy. Other types of conduct, which must be viewed on a case-by-case basis, can also rise to this level so as to be inconsistent with the protected status of natural parents. Where such conduct is properly found by the trier of fact, based on evidence in the record, custody should be determined by the 'best interest of the child' test mandated by the statute." Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997). The court found the conduct in that case, "a period of voluntary non-parent custody", sufficient justification for using the "best interest" standard. At least one federal court has recognized that, after one year in foster care, the emotional ties between the foster parent and the foster child may constitute an interest deserving of legal and constitutional protection. See Brown v. County of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 662 (1985).

    22. See in re BGC, 486 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); Schmidt v. Deboer (In re Baby Girl Clauson), 502 N.W. 2d 649 (Michigan 1993); and, in re Kirchner, 649 N.E. 2d 324 (Illinois).

    23. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16-22.

    24. This is not to say the issue has not been recognized, debated, and publicized in detailed and scholarly fashion. For a very thorough and powerful presentation of the importance of traditional counsel for children, see "Ethical Issues in the Representation of Children", Special Issue, Fordham Law Review Vol., LXIV, Number 4, March 1996. However, the thrust of this paper remains: the gap between theory and practice regarding what constitutes justice for children must be closed.

    25. Materials written by Ilene Nelson, GAL Administrator, 322 Chapanoke Road, Raleigh, North Carolina 27603 (919)662-4300.

    26. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).

    27. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

    28. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).

    29. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 207 U.S. 142, 142 (1907).

    30. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 788 N.13 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. O'Connor, J.)

    31. Kelly & Ramsey, 21 J. Family Law, 405, 453-454 (1982-1983).

    32. ABA Presidential Working Group on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children and Their Families, America's Children at Risk: A National Agenda for Legal Action 7 (American Bar Association 1993).

    33. 42 U.S.C. section 1396d(a)(4)(B). See also 42 C.F.R. section 440.40(b) and 42 C.F.R. sections 441.50-441.62.

    34. Arthur Kinoy, "The Present Crisis in American Legal Education", Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 24, 1969, pp. 5,6.

    35. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Address to the ABA Commission on Women (Aug. 1992), quoted in Marshal J. Wolf, Chairman's Column, Fam. Advocate, Fall 1992, at 2.

    36. Judge Charles D. Gill, "Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected Child-Citizen?", Ohio Northern University Law Review, Volume XVII, Number 3, p. 548 (1991).

    37. Greenville County DSS v. Bowes, et al, - SC -, (1993).

    38. Id., xx S.C. at xxx.

    39. For more information about the CRC and how you can support its ratification, contact The United States Committee for UNICEF, Office of Public Policy and Advocacy, 1775 K. Street, N.W., Suite 360, Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 296-4242.


    ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES
    Fighting for the Rights of Children:
    Health Care * Education * Safe & Permanent Families

 

 

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